全文获取类型
收费全文 | 163篇 |
免费 | 10篇 |
专业分类
财政金融 | 15篇 |
工业经济 | 9篇 |
计划管理 | 36篇 |
经济学 | 35篇 |
综合类 | 2篇 |
运输经济 | 1篇 |
旅游经济 | 3篇 |
贸易经济 | 42篇 |
农业经济 | 13篇 |
经济概况 | 16篇 |
邮电经济 | 1篇 |
出版年
2022年 | 3篇 |
2021年 | 1篇 |
2019年 | 5篇 |
2018年 | 11篇 |
2017年 | 5篇 |
2016年 | 9篇 |
2015年 | 2篇 |
2014年 | 8篇 |
2013年 | 23篇 |
2012年 | 6篇 |
2011年 | 14篇 |
2010年 | 7篇 |
2009年 | 7篇 |
2008年 | 6篇 |
2007年 | 8篇 |
2006年 | 8篇 |
2005年 | 12篇 |
2004年 | 4篇 |
2003年 | 3篇 |
2002年 | 4篇 |
2001年 | 2篇 |
2000年 | 3篇 |
1999年 | 4篇 |
1998年 | 2篇 |
1997年 | 1篇 |
1996年 | 3篇 |
1995年 | 1篇 |
1994年 | 2篇 |
1992年 | 1篇 |
1990年 | 2篇 |
1987年 | 1篇 |
1986年 | 1篇 |
1980年 | 1篇 |
1978年 | 2篇 |
1976年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有173条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
51.
52.
53.
This article uses panel data for a representative sample of Estonian enterprises to analyse diverse issues related to the determinants of ownership structures and ownership changes after privatisation. A key focus is to determine whether ownership changes are related to economic efficiency. While employee-owned firms are found to be much more prone than other firms to switch ownership categories, often ‘employee-owned’ firms remain ‘insider-owned’ as ownership passes from current employees to managers and former employees. Logit analysis of the determinants of ownership structures and ownership changes provides mixed support for several hypotheses. As predicted: (i) wealth and resource constraints play a crucial role in the determination of ownership, with foreigners buying firms with the highest equity levels and insiders buying firms with the lowest equity valuations; (ii) risk aversion explains subsequent ownership changes, especially away from employee ownership; (iii) allocation of ownership depends on the pre-privatisation origin and location of the firm, and these factors also influence subsequent ownership changes. Our findings provide mixed support for the hypothesis that ownership changes are related to economic efficiency. 相似文献
54.
55.
Niels Anthonisen 《Journal of Economic Theory》2002,107(2):253-287
This paper shows that experimentation can have the effect of inducing outcomes that are “far” from Nash in a learning model similar to that studied by D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine (1993, Econometrica61, 547-573). The game under consideration is a version of a finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, and the average length of players' lifetimes is arbitrarily large, but fixed. If the number of stages in the prisoner's dilemma is sufficiently large, then experimentation induces cooperation within the society on an arbitrarily large scale, even though the beliefs of almost all players are eventually within an arbitrary η>0 of being correct at all of the information sets in the game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72. 相似文献
56.
Synopsis This paper considers the well-known Levhari-Mirman discrete-time model of resource extraction, and investigates the effects of the information structure of the dynamic game – open-loop, Markovian or history-dependent – on the equilibrium consumption path and the overall utility of the agents. Due to the special structure of the model, the open-loop regime yields a Pareto-optimal outcome. The Markovian regime leads to the most pronounced version of the tragedy of the commons. History-dependent behavior yields an outcome set that is intermediate between the other two cases, and that may include the Pareto-optimal outcome in some cases. The level of efficiency of equilibrium behaviour is thus U-shaped as a function of the level of information the agents’ extraction strategies are based on. The analysis suggests that in environments characterized by a dynamic (and no market) externality, forcing agents to commit to open-loop behavior would constitute welfare-improving regulation. 相似文献
57.
Antidumping actions in the US and EU are known to be linked to macroeconomic conditions. In part, this is because positive injury findings may be easier to make in a downturn, increasing the chance of success for complainants. We explore the evidence for Mexico, one of the main “new” antidumping regimes. Injury determination is also critical in Mexico’s antidumping policy, as a majority of unsuccessful complaints have been rejected because of negative injury findings rather than negative findings of dumping. Working with data from 1987 to 2000, we provide evidence for a relationship between macroeconomic factors and antidumping complaints, including current account and exchange rate movements, and both local and global general macroeconomic conditions. 相似文献
58.
Unlike previous empirical work concerning investment behavior and the determinants of liquidity constraints, we use a switching regression framework when sample separation is unknown and endogenous and firms are assumed to operate either in the financially constrained or in the financially unconstrained regime. By using new panel data for Estonian companies during 1993–2002 we find that: (i) investment behavior is characterized by two distinct regimes; (ii) the likelihood of being financially constrained is higher in firms that are recently privatized, small and where ownership is concentrated in the hands of insiders and the state; (iii) the actual probabilities of operating in the financially constrained regime are quite high and essentially stable during the whole period under consideration; (iv) ownership structure affects investment beyond its indirect effects through financial constraints. 相似文献
59.
60.
Worse than others but better than before: Integrating social and temporal comparison perspectives to explain executive turnover via pay standing and pay growth 下载免费PDF全文
Organizations often pay greater salaries to higher‐ranking executives compared to lower‐ranking executives. While this method can be useful for retaining those at the organization's apex, it may also incline executives at the bottom of the pay pyramid to see themselves at a disadvantage and thus exit the firm. Naturally, organizations often want to retain some of their lower‐paid, but highly valuable executives; the question, then, is how organizations can reduce the turnover of lower‐ranking executives. By integrating social with temporal comparison theory, we argue that, when executives earn relatively less than their peers, more pay growth (i.e., individual pay increases over time) leads to less turnover. The results of our analysis, which covered almost 20 years of objective data on a large sample of U.S. top executives, provide support for our theory. 相似文献